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Introduction: Politics of
Intervention and Needs
Assessment1
'Rehabilitation' is a loaded term central to the inter-
pretive grid through which impoverished regions
and their people are known to more affluent com-
munities and individuals (Ferguson 1994).
Notions of underdevelopment, understandings of
crisis and agreed-upon solutions derive from that
same grid and its hegemonic scientific paradigm.
With reference to food insecurity and international
agricultural research, the hegemonic Western
approach overlooks the relationship between peo-
ple and their knowledge, and between researchers
and farmers (Fairhead 1993). The approach thus
separates people from their environment. When it
comes to identifying problems and thinking up
solutions, it is invariably the scientific world order-
ing logic which determines what problems exist
and what solutions will be on offer. The process
mostly begins with a 'needs assessment' exercise,
often guided by media images and rhetoric,
through which outside agency workers liaise with
local bureaucrats to arrive at perspectives and
solutions which they (the outsiders) control. The
practice is quasi universal. Thus, in the context of
homelessness in Britain, Hudson and Liddiard
(1993) argue that 'the way in which the client and
the problem [are] defined [depends] less on the
'objective' characteristics of the client and more on
the history, the political and the social objectives,
the skills, the resources and the funding base of
the agency' (Hudson and Liddiard 1993: 48).
Food insecurity in Rwanda in the immediate after-
math of the 1994 war and genocide is another
illustration of how 'the problem' and 'its solution'
are controlled not by 'the clients' but by a powerful
hegemonic discourse which remains divorced from
realities on-the-ground. What happened in post-
war Rwanda illustrates how development interests
feed upon 'the growth of ignorance' (Hobart 1993)
- and Western ignorance about Rwanda is both vast
and easily manipulated (Pottier 1995, 1996).
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In this article I first consider 'the problem' of agri-
cultural resource base erosion and food insecurity
in post-war Rwanda, and how it was perceived by
Western experts and local politicians. I then look
at 'the solution' put forward by the international
agricultural research centres (IARCs): the 'Seeds of
Hope' programme.
Emergencies are internationally interpreted as
occasions for swift action, not as opportunities for
critical reflection. In emergencies, therefore, it has
become legitimate to ignore clients' views of prob-
lems and solutions. This leads to top-down
approaches to crisis management. The habitual
top-down approach that UN agencies and voluntary
organizations take when assessing the needs of
displaced people is aptly summed up by Waidron,
who reflects on his work with refugees in Somalia
in 1981-2.
at the end of the 'emergency phase' of that
event, it seemed clear to me that the agencies of
the expatriate refugee regime - the UNHCR,
WFP and PVOs - were administering life-sus-
taining essentials to the estimated 700,000
refugees guided almost exclusively by the
top-down, self enclosed logic of bureaucracy.
Food allotments to a specific camp, for
instance, would be calculated by multiplying
the official number of camp residents by the
officially approved ration, despite the facts that
(a) the actual number of refugees in camps was
not accurately known, and (b) the actual food
available for delivery seldom reached the official
daily allotment.
(Waldron 1988: 155; emphasis added)
Humanitarian aid agencies regularly intervene,
'legitimately' they claim, on the basis of very shal-
low knowledge or even, as Waldron implies, by
ignoring the knowledge that is available.
A similar situation is here reported for Rwanda in
the immediate aftermath of the 1994 genocide and
conflict, when FAO/WFP set out to assess food
needs and the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), which groups the
IARCs, launched its 'Seeds of Hope' rescue plan. In
early August 1994, FAO/WFP assessed needs on
the basis of the self enclosed logic of bureaucracy,
to use Waidron's terminology, i.e. on the basis of
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official estimations of crop and seed losses.
Importantly, those providing the information were
gatekeepers acting on behalf of the new political
regime, often former RPA soldiers unfamiliar with
agricultural conditions in their new country (cf.
Mujawamariya 1995: 33). As a result, the FAO/WFP
assessment failed to refer to several key determi-
nants of food availability, such as ecological varia-
tions within prefectures (administrative districts);
the exact period over which short-term internally
displaced people fled; and the 'longevity' of certain
field crops not harvested on time, sorghum being
the prime example.
Bias in needs assessment also permeated the way in
which emergency food aid was dealt with in
Rwanda's 'humanitarian safe zone' (Zone Turquoise),
where relief efforts focused on internally displaced
people (IDPs) and not on local residents. The
dichotomy rested on the assumption (or bureau-
cratic logic) that hosts do not suffer when they
accommodate IDPs. (To avoid confusion, the IDPs
to whom I here refer were living not in designated
camps but with host families.) This clear-cut sep-
aration, however, did not correspond with the real-
ity of the host-refugee relationship, which was
based on a sharing of resources and life-worlds.
This sharing, including the shared understanding
that food insecurity affected refugees and hosts
alike, resulted from a long-standing relationship
based on economic opportunity for seasonal
migrant labour in the IDPs' home region. Relief
agencies ignored the reciprocity and sharing that
existed and failed to include the hosts in their
emergency programmes (Pottier 1994a). They
perceived the displaced as problematic (as being
'in need'), whereas the hosts, living in their
own homes, were regarded as un-problematic, not-
in-need.
The origin of this dichotomy lies in the value-laden
meanings carried by the words 'displaced' and
'uprooted'. As used within the discourse of the
international community and in Western culture at
large, such terms convey images of 'broken roots'
and hence suggest an 'ailing' identity (Malkki
1992). This is another example of the power of
Western hegemonic discourse. The suggested asso-
ciation occurs because Western notions of cul-
ture/stability routinely equate culture with a
territorilized concept (Malkki 1992: 34).
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This deeply engrained approach to culture predis-
poses the international relief worker to see refugees
as out-of-place, helpless victims. This involves
denying the refugees agency, for instance through
downplaying the existence of effective self-help
strategies and the importance of refugee-host
relations. Such strategies and their benefits are
routinely overlooked (Hansen 1991; Leach
1992; Turton and Turton 1984). The denial then
justifies that a bureaucratic logic of needs (a
quick, official estimation of loss and damage)
should prevail.
The present article argues that the FAO/WFP assess-
ment of crop and seed losses adopted such an offi-
cial view and, with media assistance, paved the way
for what looked like a perfectly logical and legiti-
mate intervention by powerful donors: the 'Seeds
of Hope' programme backed by CIAT/CGIAR and
the World Bank.
Agricultural Situation in the
Immediate Aftermath of
Rwanda's War and Genocide
(July 1994-Early 1995)
To follow my argument it is useful first to present
some principles of Rwandan agriculture and say
something about conditions in the post-war era.
Agricultural biodiversity, one of Rwanda's most
important economic resources, is linked to topogra-
phy; linked to the fact that the country's food grow-
ing areas range from the (cooler) high altitude zones
in the West to the (warmer) low altitude zones in
the east. Three broad zones can be discerned:
high, middle and low altitude. Within these zones,
which can be broken up into some eight or nine
agro-ecological zones, there is further diversity as
each zone has soils that range from high to low fer-
tility Moreover, each area has its specific disease
problems. It is in response to this wide range of
agro-ecological conditions and in an attempt to
reduce the risk of crop failure due to climatic irreg-
ularities and specific diseases that farmers strive to
grow locally adapted seed. In the case of beans, a
major crop, this spreading of risk has resulted in
a strong preference for varietal mixtures. (Rwanda
has over 200 known landraces.) Varietal mixtures
'effectively reduce disease severity and spread
and may have further yield-enhancing effects
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through the association of beans of different plant
architectures' (Voss 1992: 34).
Other important crops in Rwanda include sorghum
(for which, again, several varieties exist, all locally
adapted), bananas (mostly for beer brewing),
maize, sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes, cassava and
taro. On the importance of sorghum, ICRISAT, the
International Agricultural Research Centre (IARC)
dealing with sorghum, has written:
Sorghum is an important crop in Rwanda, con-
sumed both as a porridge and a beverage. The
crop supplies Rwandans with about 20 per
cent of their caloric and 17 per cent of their
protein intake. Sorghum is grown in all regions
of the country, with the area under the crop
covering 150,000 hectares.
(Rwanda News, September 1994)
Harvest and seed losses, for beans as well as
sorghum, feature prominently in reports on the
agricultural devastation that hit Rwanda in 1994.
Losses were declared 'almost total' and the long-
term solution ('Seeds of Hope') was conceived on
the presupposition that the lost seed needed
urgently to be replaced with new, locally adapted
seed. The urgency was not (and could not be) dis-
puted. Put differently, the rehabilitation debate was
couched in terms of a straightforward substitution
of new seed propagated from suitable seed stocks
preserved by the world's leading agricultural
research centres (IARCs). Officially, the challenge
was to do a thorough job - and to do it fast.
But was the situation that straightforward? My
asking the question has to do with three facts: a)
Rwanda is ecologically varied, which the architects
of 'Seeds of Hope' were aware of; b) war and dis-
placement did not affect all regions in the same way,
which was never fully investigated; and c) post-war
Rwanda was politically, socially and economically a
different place from what it had been before the
genocide. Not only had there been massive popu-
lation displacements - 'new' refugees leaving
Rwanda or becoming internally displaced, 'old
caseload' Tutsi refugees returning; there had also
been an influx of cattle estimated at well over half
a million head. It is against the backdrop of
Rwanda's diverse ecology diverse war experiences
and its vastly changed socio-economic reality that
I shall go beyond the internationally accepted
wisdom that only the IARCs, networked through
CGIAR, could replace the lost seed. I shall draw
attention to the differential impact the tragedy has
had on the agricultural scene. Differences will be
spelled out both at the level of agro-ecological zones
and within them. In addition, I shall argue that any
discussion of sustainable agricultural rehabilitation
will need to respond to some significant social, eco-
nomic and political changes.
The article is in three parts. I start with the 'worst
case scenarios' of agricultural destruction as por-
trayed by international development actors: politi-
cians, medical experts, the media and agricultural
interest groups. These portrayals share the percep-
tion of a near-total ecological calamity, about to
bring famine and wipe outcrop genetic diversity. In
Part Two, I build up an alternative, more nuanced
picture of the food and agricultural situation, based
on findings by FAO/WFP (1994) and a food secu-
rity assessment I carried out on behalf of Save The
Children - UK (Pottier 1994a). I shall situate my
understanding of agricultural rehabilitation within
the context of Rwanda's changing political and eco-
nomic realities. In Part Three I examine the track
record of 'Seeds of Hope', the international pro-
gramme launched to return (restore) appropriate
seed to Rwanda. Here I shall draw from interviews
with FAO and WFP personnel in Kigali.
I Emergence of a Disaster
Narrative with a Perfect Solution
1.1 How devasted was the
agricultural sector? - first
assessments, July/August 1994
Before entering the discussion proper, it is useful to
remind that Rwanda has three growing seasons:
Season A, from September to January. Beans,
sorghum (at high altitude) and maize are the
main crops. In calendar terms, the season is
referred to as falling in the following year. The
season starting in September 1994 is thus
referred to as the 1995A season.
Season B, from February to July. Sorghum
(grown at mid- and low-altitude) is the main
crop but beans and maize are also prominent.
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Season C, from July to September. Although
this is the dry season, cultivation in the low-
lands and valley bottoms is possible, especially
for sweet potatoes.
Note: Root and tuber crops (sweet potato,
potato, cassava, taro/colocasia) are cultivated
year round.
Early comments on the impact of the conflict on
Rwanda's food production capacity claimed that the
loss of harvests and seeds was virtually total.
Almost instantaneously, it was revealed that there
existed a solution: the 'Seeds of Hope' programme,
a long-term international solution through which
crop production and biodiversity would be quickly
restored. This restoration, the programme's bosses
pointed out, would prove far less expensive than
long-term dependency on food aid.
As soon as the war finished, starvation was on the
lips of many eminent visitors to Rwanda. Thus Dr
Goemaere (MSF, Artsen Zonder Grenzen) warned
of an unprecedented catastrophy.
Dr Goemaere, who visited Byumba, Kigali,
Nyamata and Nyanza, was struck by the fields
of sorghum, cassava and bananas ready for
harvesting. If harvests were not brought in
with urgency, we could expect famine on an
unprecedented scale.
(Het Volk, 20/7/94; my translation)
Two months later, Professor Henri Vis, an expert on
nutrition in Rwanda (Vis et al., 1975), reinforced
the famine warning when returniig from a 20-day
visit to Burundi, Eastern Zaire and Rwanda.
The president of Belgium's UNICEF Committee,
Professor Henri Vis, says he is "very pessimistic"
about the situation in the Great Lakes region,
where, he believes, famine may well be on
its way.
Professor Vis has raised the alarm. "I have criss-
crossed the countryside and have seen only few
people working the land. The coming harvests
have little chance of being sufficient. We are
fast approaching food shortages and famine."
(Le Courier de l'Escaut, 29/9/94)
In the second week of August 1994, Rwanda's
Prime Minister, Faustin Twagiramungu, expressed
his pessimism on the subject of post-war harvest-
ing. For the country as a whole, he declared:
'We have had no harvest this year and we will
probably have none next year. Either people
come back and start working again to feed
themselves, or they can live on external aid.
There are no other alternatives'.
(La Libre Belgique, 9/8/94)
The Prime Minister predicted that Rwanda would
remain dependent on international food aid for
about two years. The long time the recovery was
expected to take reflected uncertainty about the
speed with which 'new' refugees and IDPs would
return to their homes. In the weeks leading up to
the September planting season (1995A), several
Kigali officials argued that agricultural recovery was
impossible without the return of the refugees.
Consequently, some agencies - UNICEF and the
Catholic Relief Service (CRS), for instance - joined
hands with the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) to
provide incentives for refugees to come home and
harvest (Pottier 1994a: 51).
Initially, 'new refugees' were central to the debate on
agricultural rehabilitation and national food secu-
rity, along with seeds, tools and livestock.
September being the start of the first agricultural
season, there was much concern over the neglect
of on-farm activity. Not only were about half the
farmers away from home, there was also a tremen-
dous shortage of seeds and tools. The argument
went that if Rwanda's food production sector was to
recover, all four elements had to return. The lost
seeds, animals and tools had to be replaced; the
lost farmers, where they were still alive, had to
return from the refugee or IDP camps. National
and international experts agreed with Rwanda's
new leaders, particularly with Huta representatives,
that the return of the refugees was essential for
revitalizing the agricultural sector.
Throughout August 1994, there were reports of
near-total harvest failure, anarchy and devastation.
MSF-Belgium backed the view that Rwanda's most
2 Dr. Reginald Moreels later became Belgium's new
Secretary of State for Development Cooperation.
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recent harvest had virtually been lost. lt was also
doubtful that Rwanda would harvest in January
1995. Dr Reginald Moreels, then president of MSF-
Belgium, declared after a visit to Rwanda:
'The only area where I saw people harvest was
the no-man's-land between the French Zone
Turquoise and the town of Butare. The rainy
season starts in a month's time ... There is a risk
that next year's harvest will be in doubt, too'.
(L'Echo de la Bourse, 12/8/94)2
Liberation, the French newspaper which exposed
the role of France in the genocide, painted a similar,
uniformly catastrophic picture at the end of August.
Harvesting practically equalled anarchy. Moreover,
the refugees were not returning even though the
rains were imminent. Worse still, farmers who were
at home seemed too lethargic or frightened to work
their fields. The overall impression the humanitar-
ian visitor to Rwanda was getting was one of total
dislocation.
Since May, the Rwandan countryside has
become a huge larder. The convoys of the exo-
dus, first the Tutsi refugees, then the Hutu, the
campaigning soldiers or those engaged in ban-
ditry, the villagers, all these people in their
upside-down world roam around gathering
sorghum for fou-fou, manioc for flour and avo-
cado pears. The urban dweller is turning to
cultivation. In Gisenyi, Kigali, Butare and
Gitarania, towns where no business is going
on, where no jobs can be got and no salaries
earned, the people go to the hills where they
hoe and uproot, frequently without possessing
the required skills and knowledge. This only
delays the disaster. In a country where stabil-
ity is already precarious, it is going to be diffi-
cult to recover from one disasterous harvest,
let alone two.
Up until now, three out of four farmers have
still not returned to the countryside controlled
by the RPF, which lies fallow as far as the eye
can see. Half the farmers fled to the Zone
Turquoise. This does not mean that those who
stayed behind are working the fields. Nowhere
does the farmer work, despite the fact that this
month is the time for field preparation and
planting, for beans and spring fruit, for summer
maize and bananas. The rains are coming. In a
few weeks' time it will be too late.
(Liberation, 26/8/94; my translation)
Importantly, the imminent-famine and eco-catastro-
phy warnings spread around the globe when the
war was still ongoing and a 'needs assessment'
could not possibly be carried out.
1.2 'Seeds of Hope' - the perfect
solution
The famine-cum-eco-catastrophy scenario origi-
nally came from the architects of 'Seeds of Hope', a
concerned group with a solution in mind. Holding
the key to the proposed restoration, CGIAR offered
the following narrative on the devastation.
less than 30 per cent of crops planted in this
current season will be harvested. Most, if not
all, of the harvest will be eaten to avoid immi-
nent starvation. It is extremely unlikely that
seed will be retained for planting in October,
1994 and February 1995.
The statement concluded:
Initially some planting seed will be provided by
relief agencies and NGOs, either directly or as a
spin-off from food aid. However, growing con-
ditions in Rwanda are sfficiently unique
that varieties brought in from other areas
will be poorly adapted, disease susceptible
and thus poor yielding. It is essential and
urgent that adapted germplasm is introduced
as quickly as possible.
(CIAT Circular, July/August 1994; emphasis
added)
This statement, which has all the trappings of an
environmental disaster narrative (see Roe 1995),
was released some ten days before the Goma exo-
dust The war was still ongoing. The emphasis on
external intervention and speed was justified
through reference to the threat of imminent starva-
tion and by assuming that Rwandan farmers were
without initiatives of their own. Rwandan farmers
were denied agency
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The solution lay in CGIAR's worldwide laboratories,
where much of Rwanda's germplasm had been
stored.
When CGIAR first exposed the extent of the envi-
ronmental catastrophy, nobody was in a position to
argue against it or to ask questions about whether
the gloom-and-doom perspective would apply to
all parts of the country and all segments of rural
society. How uniform was the devastation? Had
farmers really consumed their unique seeds? Was
an external solution the only conceivable one? As
'Seeds of Hope' emerged as the solution, amidst
considerable publicity, such important questions
could not as yet be answered.
The difference between 'Seeds and Tools' (Phase 1)
and 'Seeds of Hope' (Phase 2) was that the former
activity was regarded as an emergency measure,
whereas the second programme was more of a
development (or rehabilitation) exercise, an attempt
to restore Rwanda's farming systems and rich
biodiversity.
'Seeds of Hope' was expected to provide a
model for cooperation between institutions to
bridge the gap between short-term emergency
relief and reconstruction and development
assistance to Rwandese nationals.
(Rwanda News, October 1994)
The architects of 'Seeds of Hope' regarded 'Seeds
and Tools' (Phase 1) as no more than a temporary
measure which would ensure farmers planted and
reaped 'something' during the fast approaching sea-
son. People would receive seeds and plant them,
but it was thought unlikely that these seeds would
be appropriate for the specific micro-conditions
under which they would be grown. Moreover,
Many of the relief agencies and NGOs con-
cerned with restoring food production and
security in Rwanda hacked] technical and sci-
entific insight into the complexities of crop
production.
('Seeds of Hope' CGIAR Circular, July or
August, p.1)
Despite the clear contours of the official CGIAR
diagnosis and solution, scientists with first-hand
knowledge and experience of Rwanda's unique seed
patrimonium struggled to accept the correctness of
this standardized verdict. Through the vehicle of
IDRC, Canada, they asked questions about the uni-
formity of the devastation and about the need for
a full-scale rescue package from the outside
(J .Voss: personal communication). They pressed
for a proper needs assessment at the end of the
war. But CGIAR chose not to investigate. Instead,
the environmental disaster narrative was kept intact
and re-released via the media some five months
after the 1990-1994 war ended.
This is how the CGIAR establishment portrayed the
agricultural sector:
Virtually all of Rwanda's seed supply has
been eaten by the famished citizens or
destroyed during the fighting between rival
Hutu and Tutsi factions that left as many as one
million dead and forced hundreds of thousands
in refugee camps...
"Without seeds," said Ismail Serageldin, chair-
man of the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research, "Rwanda will not be able
to plant next year and will have no harvest.
Farmers will become beggars and millions of
people would again depend on outside food
aid."
(International Herald Tribune, 13/12/94;
emphasis added)
Within the logic of the prevailing narrative, the
International Herald Tribune referred to 'Seeds
of Hope' as 'a plan to avert famine'.
A Belgian paper noted on the same day:
Rwandans have consumed the last seed sup-
plies in order to survive the country's civil war.
(Financieel Economische Tijd, 13/12/95)
The crux of the matter is that CGIAR's press com-
muniqués in mid-December 1994 came two
months after FAO declared that the September
planting season had been saved (see below).
CGIAR stuck to its original vision of early July,
thus ignoring, as I shall show, a number of correc-
tions to the disaster scenario that had already
been made. Moreover, disaster-image reinforcing
media distortions accompanied the narrative. Le
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Soir, for instance, commented on Mr Serageldin's
statement:
The destruction caused by the civil war is so
vast that the different varieties of beans and
sorghum, and of maize grown as cattle feed,
have virtually disappeared. Drought during
the previous [agricultural] season has aggra-
vated the situation, thus causing an overall
reduction in the harvest of 30 percent. This
could lead to famine in this formerly self-
sufficient country of 7.9 million people. The
CGIAR has decided to launch an operation
named 'Seeds of Hope' which aims to provide
seeds to at least 40 percent of Rwanda's farmers
in 1995 and 100 per cent in 1996.
(Le Soir; 13/12/94; emphasis added)
Media claims about the agricultural crisis suggested
a near-total disaster and, in the above example, a
pre-war situation of national food sufficiency. The
update in Le Soir, based on CGIAR information,
was distorted. First, the extent of the harvest and
seed losses had been vast but not uniform - which
(by December) was already known. Second, the
drought to which reference is made occurred in
South Rwanda, where rains were late, but its occur-
rence was not nationwide. In fact, North Rwanda
had enjoyed a good harvest despite the war. Third,
to imply that the country was food sufficient
before the war was incorrect.
2 Harvest and Seed Losses: A
More Nuanced Picture Emerges
(August to late September 1994)
Given the tenacity of the CGIAR narrative, it is
pertinent to ask what efforts were undertaken to
realistically assess the food and agricultural situa-
tion in the immediate post-war era.
The official task of assessing the food situation as
soon as the war ended fell to FAO/WFP, whose mis-
sion concluded that not all prefectures had been
equally affected. Nonetheless, the devastation was
vast enough to get a huge international 'Seeds and
Tools' operation under way in time for 'Season A.
Shortly after the FAO/WFP mission was completed,
a more nuanced picture of the situation emerged
through my own work for SCF-UK and through a
collaborative reassessment of the situation in
Butare. The SCF-UK assessment recorded the var-
ied situation within prefectures, while revealing
that certain regions (notably in the north and east)
had harvested more than had been predicted.
Leaving aside the situation in the IDP camps,
famine was not imminent in Rwanda for those
who lived at home, but there was a need to
address problems hitherto not highlighted. In
particular, the SCF study found that household
food insecurity was not confined to the loss of
'seeds and tools', but included severe, possibly
long-term disruptions to familiar seed supply chan-
nels and familiar livelihood strategies. Equally
important, it became clear that seed losses were
far from uniform.
I shall now summarize and comment on the two
assessments.
21 The FAO/WFP Assessment
The FAO/WPF Crop and Food Supply Assessment,
which covered 9 prefectures between 9-17 August
1994, concluded for the country as a whole that
food shortages were most severe, and coupled with
a lack of purchasing capacity to meet basic food needs.
Prices of beans and cereals have more than dou-
bled since the beginning of the year, reflecting
more the scarcity of supplies than strong effec-
tive demand. In the case of roots and tubers,
prices Ihad] increased by more than 200 per-
cent, reflecting also the preference for cheap
sources of food. Other evident indicators of the
food difficulties faced by the population [were]
the low prices of livestock, that farmers sell to
obtain resources to buy food, and the wide-
spread evidence of premature harvesting of
roots and tubers observed by the Mission in the
fields as well as in the markets
(FAO,WFP 1994: 11).
The survey estimated that some 2.5 million people,
or half the estimated population inside Rwanda,
had inadequate access to food and would require
emergency food aid until the next harvest of
January 1995. The food insecure included deficit
farmers, vulnerable groups (orphans, the poor, the
disabled, the elderly, in-patients) and displaced
people.
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The most food insecure areas, the FAO/WFP study
established, were the prefectures of Byumba, where
agriculture had come to a halt when the war started
in 1990; Gikongoro, drought-prone and flooded
with IDPs; Ruhengeri and Kigali, where the poorest
workers and farmers were hit hardest. In contrast,
the prefectures of Gisenyi, Gitarama, Butare and
Kibungo (the latter a region virtually depopulated)
appeared to meet the food needs of their present
populations (FAO/WFP 1994: 14), but a large
deficit of bean seed was forecast. These four pre-
fectures, FAO/FWP claimed, had 'suffered least
from food shortfalls as the population [had] had
access to harvested and standing crops. The food
deficit [was] negligible.' This was the first indication
that the impact of the war had not been uniform.
The FAO/WFP report emphasised that swift
international action to supply seeds and tools in
time for Season A would make redundant the pro-
vision of large amounts of food assistance after
January 1995. To ensure that distributed seeds
would not be consumed, beneficiaries would
receive full or partial WFP daily rations of 350
grams of cereals, 120 grams of pulses and 25 grams
of vegetable oil (1,883 Kcal) over a period of five
months, until the January 1995 harvests.
FAO/WFP estimated that US$ 400,000 (or more)
was needed for the first phase in the rehabilitation
of the agricultural sector, a phase known as the
'Seeds and Tools' programme. After securing the
necessary funds, FAO/WFP and other organisations
bought seed in neighbouring countries and shipped
it to Kigali for onward distribution inside Rwanda.
Distribution was left to a multitude of NGOs, which
caused confúsion about actual requirements, dïstri-
bution capacity and coordination. Not all NGOs
came to the weekly 'Seeds and Tools' meetings in
Kigali, thus making it difficult for UNREO, the
coordinator, to build up and update a coherent
picture of needs and deliveries.
When the FAO/WFP study became available, cer-
tain agencies (and the present author) became
concerned about the positive verdict on Butare.
(Later, in retrospect, I would also be puzzled by the
negative image portrayed for Ruhengeri.) That
Butare would not be an area of particular need was
striking, because reports released just before the
genocide (Caritas 1994, World Bank 1993) had
forecast a very grim future. The 1993 World Bank
report had ranked Butare third on its poverty index
of Rwandan prefectures (World Bank 1993).
Concern over the FAO/WPF mission report led to a
pooling of resources between UNICEF, SCF-UK,
WFP, ICRC, SAB (Service Agricole de Butare) and
the Butare prefecture itself, from which a more
detailed, less rapid assessment of the food and
agriculture situation got under way.
2.2 The UNICEF/SCF-
UK/WFP/ICRC/SAB Assessment
For Butare, the re-assessment found that certain
areas to the north, south and south-west of Butare
town had been particularly hard hit, because farm-
ers there had borne the brunt of two streams of
desperate, hungry refugees. The first wave, mainly
Tutsi refugees who feared being massacred by
Hutu militias, had come through in April-June;
the second wave had arrived in June-July when
the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) moved
towards Butare and the Hutu population feared
retribution.
Assessing harvests and harvest losses in any imme-
diate post-war setting is an activity fraught with
methodological problems. Farmers may exaggerate
losses (hoping for help), quantification is impossi-
ble, and there are precise local factors to be taken
into account. In my experience of four Rwandan
regions, how much a commune or a household had
harvested depended not only on whether refugees
had passed through, but also on when farmers fled
and when they returned. A speedy return mini-
mized losses and also offered the chance to harvest
the fields of those who had not returned.
Specifically - and this was crucial - households that
had planted sweet potatoes before fleeing, had had
a crop to return to. Provided the farm had not been
raided by fleeing refugees, having a recent sweet
potato field crop greatly enhanced the chances of
staying reasonably food secure.
The Butare (re)assessment team noted important
internal differences regarding crop losses and
seed availability. Agro-ecological conditions
In November 1994, ACORD mistakenly believed that
Bugesera had been 'stable for relatively longer than other
areas [because it was]... taken by the RPF in the early
weeks of the fighting' (ACORD 1994: 1). Bugesera, the
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became significant. Besides having to cope with
refugees, some areas had had to cope (as always)
with the poverty of their soils. Butare may be situ-
ated in the mid-altitude zone, but its soils range
from quite fertile in the north-east to very poor in
the south and south-west. The decline of fertility
along this north-east/south-west axis meant that
poor areas visited by refugees stood little chance of
keeping their food stocks and seeds.
The reassessment also concluded that major
income generating opportunities had been lost. In
the case of men, the losses included opportunities
for seasonal agricultural work in Bugesera and
Kibungo, areas now deserted and very insecure, as
well as opportunities for casual work in Kigali.3
Women were equally affected as they could no
longer secure seasonal work on the larger farms
within the locality.
That farmers had lost not only seeds and tools but
also vital livelihood strategies based on mobility
(and hence adequate security, which was not guar-
anteed) was a conclusion which broadened the
perspective on agricultural rehabilitation. As many
farmers normally buy their seed (or part of the
seed), they need income regularly. The loss of
incomes and livelihoods, as opposed to the loss
of seeds and tools, suggested that rehabilitation
would require more than the mere replacement
of inputs and implements.
This conclusion was also reached in the SCF assess-
ment for other parts of Rwanda.
2.3 The SCF study (outside Butare)
The SCF study, carried out in two highland areas
(Ruhengeri, Gikongoro) and one other area situated
at middle altitude (Byumba), concluded that
income-generating opportunities, usually available
as seasonal agricultural work and small-scale trad-
ing, had been severely disrupted everywhere. It
followed that efforts to reintroduce 'seeds and
tools' (the focus of the official rehabilitation pro-
gramme, Phase I) would need to be complemented
with the restoration of livelihood strategies. This
site of horrific massacres, also in the run up to the 1994
genocide (Reyntjens 1994: 184-185), remained
unsettled for a much longer period.
presented quite a challenge given the omnipresence
of the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), frequent
reprisal killings and indiscriminate arrests.
In line with the FAO/WFP assessment, the SCF
study (2 5/8 -2 5/9/94) confirmed the high vulnera-
bility of Byumba, where agricultural production
had been disrupted since the onset of the war.
Agriculture in Byumba's border areas had been dis-
rupted for some four years, while disruption in the
'demilitarized zone' had begun in December 1993.
The study also confirmed the vulnerability of
Gikongoro, which is food insecure even at the best
of times. For Ruhengeri prefecture, on the other
hand, the study suggested there was a need for
nuance. Farmers living near the Kigali-Ruhengeri-
Gisenyi road had suffered disproportionately from
looting by refugees, but farmers farther inland had
often escaped these ravages and, in any case, had
fled their homes for short periods only These
inland farmers had managed to keep crop losses
down, even though livestock losses had often
been high. Transport opportunities between
Ruhengeri and Kigali (still far from normal in
September 1994, but better than elsewhere)
ensured that the trade in Irish potatoes was pick-
ing up and that some cash would flow back into
the area. This clearly aided recovery On balance,
the needs of Byumba and Gikongoro were consid-
ered much greater than those of Ruhengeri. The
FAO/WFP portrayal of Ruhengeri as food insecure
looked suspect.
I shall now summarize the principal findings of the
SCF study, starting with the harvest-cum-seed situ-
ation for beans and sorghum. Next I shall make
some general points regarding the wider socioeco-
nomic framework within which agricultural reha-
bilitation has to be understood. This involves a
look at labour and land, livelihoods, and vulnerable
groups.
Beans
Market price increases in Gikongoro prefecture,
especially away from the town, indicated how food
insecure the area had become. The cost of basic
foodstuffs in the region (then referred to as the
Turquoise 'humanitarian safe zone') were much
higher than the average of 200 percent suggested
by FAO/WFP Three-, four- and even five-fold
increases were common, while in some areas the
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price of preferred bean mixtures (for planting)
had risen to ten times or more the price that had
prevailed for the same season in 1993.
Initially I went along with the view that these
exhorbitant prices confirmed that adapted seed was
indeed in danger of disappearing. Staying on in the
area a little longer, however, taught me that high
prices were more likely to reflect temporary, not
permanent scarcity To give just one example, beans
suitable for planting in northern Gikongoro had
become so scarce that their price has risen to 500
RwF per kilo. That price had been set by traders in
Muko market (7/9/94) for varietal mixtures with a
high concentration of the locally preferred gitsim-
bayogi and nyirabukara. Well beyond the means of
even better-off farmers, the price suggested extreme
scarcity But the source of this scarcity could not
be established beyond doubt as several plausible
explanations existed: near depletion of the genetic
stock (the CGIAR scenario); the collapse of the
agricultural support system in Gikongoro prefec-
ture; and/or tight border controls by the Rwandese
Patriotic Army (RPA) which prevented the move-
ment of produce into the zone. Interviews with
farmers suggested the third option was the more
plausible one.
In other areas too, farmers complained that their
preferred bean mixtures were no longer available.
Thus farmers in communes west and south of
Butare town, where soils are poorer and where tens
of thousands of refugees had come through, com-
plained bitterly that appropriate bean seed was no
longer available. In Gishamvu, for instance, only
bean mixtures from Burundi were available. They
did not contain the preferred local varieties (e.g.
rushingacumu, carolina, ubusosera, nyirabukara) in
sufficiently high concentrations. The loss of these
locally preferred bean types did not mean, however,
that the genetic stock was endangered. As farmers
pointed out, the problem rather was that the supply
of seed from Bugesera, on which they rely, had
dried up (see Kabukuba market, below)
That scarcity did not necessarily mean that the
genetic stock was in danger was also clear from
discussions I had with farmers in Miyove, Byumba
Prefecture (12/9/94). They, too, complained about
the scarcity of their preferred varietal mixtures in
the local market; mixtures that would normally
come from Mutara. Mutara mixtures are preferred
because they include the varieties nyirahabonobono
and gikoba. The mixtures available in Miyove in
September 1994 had come from Ruhengeri and
were judged not to be as appropriate to local soil
conditions as the mixtures from Mutara. Potential
buyers also objected to the prohibitive price of 120
RwF/kg. Having only recently taken up agriculture
again, after living in camps for the past two years,
Miyove farmers simply did not have the means to
purchase the seed on offer. Bean seed from Mutara,
however, was still reaching markets to the east of
Byumba (e.g. Bwisige), but the overall volume of
beans available for trade had been much reduced.
Mutara beans no longer reached Miyove. The les-
son I learned from this (and from similar experi-
ences in other parts of the country, see below) was
that restoring biodiversity required more than a
straightforward substitution (or reintroduction)
of seed, it was also necessary to address the
restoration of customary seed supply channels.
(An additional lesson was that so-called 'locally
adapted' seed was often a mixture part of which
was derived from outside the locality itself. See
Pottier 1994b.)
In places where Mutara beans were available, as in
Bwisige secteur, farmers complained that they
lacked the money to buy the beans they needed
for seed purposes, for triage. Some calculation is
useful here. The Mutara bean mixtures normally
contain only about 20 per cent locally adapted
bean seed, which means that to obtain 1kg of seed,
farmers had to buy 5kg of beans in the market.
(This cash constraint reinforces my earlier point
about the need to restore livelihoods.) Farmers in
Bwisige lacked cash because they lived too far
away from the main Kabale-Kigali road where
ICRCJWFP distributed food aid. People in coin-
munes nearer the main road could choose to sell
the donated food to obtain cash for seed, which
many did. Food aid - especially rice - was sold to
traders from Kigali.
I reached a similar conclusion for Butare prefecture,
which, like Byumba, depends to a large degree on
bean seed imports from outside, e.g. from nearby
Bugesera. Many preferred bean mixtures in Butare
contain some seed from Bugesera, the region with
which an active flow of labour and produce is nor-
mally maintained. Unavailability of 'local seed'
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had much to do with depopulation and the high
insecurity in Bugesera.
Situated in the south of Kigali prefecture, Bugesera,
a well watered and normally fertile region, had been
described in the FAO assessment as 'very seriously
affected by the civil war' and suffering 'very heavy
crop losses'. With hindsight, these losses were not
so much real as reflecting a shortage of farm labour.
Some five weeks after the FAO/WFP Mission visited
the region, I visited the market at Kabukuba
(19/9/94) to find that the two most common local
bean mixtures were available and sold relatively
cheaply (4SF/kg). With a significant number of
people drifting back to Bugesera during the inter-
vening period (late August) it became clear that
harvests were late rather than lost.
The first bean seed mixture, ideal for planting in
banana groves, was dominated by red and purplish
beans (eg mutiki) and contained a good percentage
of the small, peanut-like and much praised imberege
bean. The second mixture, ideal for planting in val-
leys (or on hills when rain is insufficient), had an
overall yellow-orangey tinge and contained plenty
of muhondo and ntabeza beans. Farmers were
confident that harvest losses, while significant,
had not impaired their capacity for meeting
local seed requirements. Farmers explained they
had fled their homes in April and had returned
only in late August, which was well past the normal
harvest time for beans, i.e. June. Nevertheless,
they could harvest enough beans so as not to
endanger the local supply of seed for September-
October. (As Rwanda's south-east remained seri-
ously depopulated, farmers who returned home
could help themselves to the crops of absent
neighbours.)
Importantly, however, farmer optimism at
Kabukuba market was not shared by merchants.
They were concerned about the low level of trade,
as a result of which they would fail to supply farm-
ers elsewhere in the country, especially those living
at the periphery of the normal sphere of trade. This
included Gikongoro. Seed from Bugesera did reach
markets in the northern parts of Butare Prefecture,
as I observed in Nyabisindu, but farmers in com-
munes to the west and south of Butare, were
deprived. The merchants also expressed pessimism
regarding the availability of seed in future years.
The very low population level might lead to a dra-
matic decline.
Finally, there were areas where seed availability
had been little affected by the war. Ruhengeri was
a case in point. In several parts of the prefecture,
for instance at the Centre de négoce at Gakenke, near
Nemba, which I visited at the end of August, farm-
ers were optimistic about the availability of planting
beans. This bi-weekly market had just started up
again and thousands attended that day (30/8/94),
compared with just a handful of people three
weeks earlier. The revival of this important regional
market, situated along the Kigali-Ruhengeri road,
came at the onset of the 1995A season and showed
up a near-normal picture as far as the bean
supply was concerned. Notable was the presence
of ample quantities of locally adapted mixtures
from the nearby commune of Cyeru, which tradi-
tionally provides this market with beans. If market-
goers had a request it was for more eating-beans
(of the type ICRC/WFP distributed) to make sure
the available seed mixtures would not be eaten
before planting. The bean price, 80F/kg for both
bush and climbing beans (against 60-65F the
previous year), was considered high, but not high
enough to suggest scarcity.
One important lesson for conducting needs assess-
ments under post-war conditions is that such activ-
ities must be carried out at regular intervals.
Regarding bean seed availability in northern
Rwanda, for example, the few weeks in between the
FAO/WFP assessment and my own had allowed
new evidence to emerge. This new evidence coun-
tered the dominant/persisting disaster narrative.
By dwelling on the case of bean seed, the following
messages should have been conveyed.
Seed scarcity in post-war Rwanda was not
uniform, nor was it synonymous with the
destruction of genetic stock. Claims that
genetic stock was virtually wiped out were
clearly exaggerated. The scenario conformed
with what informed agricultural researchers
had envisaged.
Efforts to restore on-farm biodiversity must
take into account that many farmers rely to
some extent on seed supplies from outside
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their areas. Farmer definitions of 'locally
adapted seed' do not preclude purchases from
nearby areas. Rather the opposite may hold as
farmers continuously experiment with new
planting materials. Despite the difficult situa-
tion inside Rwanda, beans to be used as
food/seed would circulate in markets, albeit on
a reduced scale.
Restoring biodiversity must include the
restoration of supply channels and, ultimately,
the restoration of livelihood patterns and
strategies.
For other crops, the SCF study reached the follow-
ing conclusions.
Sweet potatoes
Disruption in the production of sweet potatoes was
closely linked to the actual dates on which people
fled from and returned to their homes. An impor-
tant issue was whether farmers fled before or after
planting dry-season sweet potatoes. Where farmers
fled after planting, there existed a good chance that
vine cuttings would be available for use in
September-October.
Farmers expected a severe shortage of cuttings
during 'Season A, yet most women farmers inter-
viewed believed that the problem would be
resolved by the second planting season, which
started in January-February 1995. As details of the
'Seeds of Hope' restoration plan were already circu-
lating, the SCF study concluded that one sub-pro-
gramme - i.e. the provision of sweet potato cuttings
planned for the 1995 'Season B' - would not be
needed. This was later confirmed through a com-
bined MINAGRI/FAO study (see below).
Cassava
Cassava production was disrupted as there had
been little or no planting during the months of
massacre and intensified war. In some areas, this
could lead to a shortage of cassava in approximately
one to one-and-a-half years' time. (How serious
this problem would be was hard to predict, but it
was unlikely to arise before 1996.) However, as
weeding had been neglected, it was clear that har-
vests in the near future would also be poor.
Sorghum
As with beans, the precise timing of farmers'
absences determined whether and how much they
could harvest. The surprise factor, however, was
that sorghum had proved a very resilient crop,
harvestable well beyond its normal dates.
Thus in Kabukuba market, Bugesera, farmers spoke
of sorghum as the field crop that had survived best.
Returning in late August, farmers were still able to
harvest sorghum with a minimum of loss.
(Sorghum is normally harvested in June and July)
That the good field crop had also turned into a good
harvest was obvious from the volume of sorghum
that market traders were buying up for retailing
elsewhere. Because of the good supply, the price
farmers received was a low 16-17F/kg, with some
producers complaining they had been paid as little
as 1OF/kg. Bugesera and many other parts of the
dry, hot region of Amayaga (basically Eastern
Rwanda) export sorghum to the rest of the country
during this time of year, including Ruhengeri.
(Being higher up, Ruhengeri has a different cycle for
sorghum production and harvests in late February
or early March.)
The main sorghum varieties grown in and around
Kabukuba, and throughout Amayaga, are the local
hilongo variety and the improved, fast-maturing
bagarumbise normally purchased from ISAR,
Rwanda's national agricultural research institute.
The immediate future of ISAR (and hence the
availability of bagarumbise) was uncertain as the sta-
tion had been a target for mass killings during the
genocide. Rehabilitation of ISAR, however, was
part of the 'Seeds of Hope' plan.4 Ki(ongo, on the
other hand, was in no danger of becoming scarce.
Varieties grown in northern Rwanda include three
types that can be grown either on upland farms or
in valleys. These are the favoured muhimpundu,
which yields very well, ndamuga, which gives good
results, and amabereyingoma. The farmers inter-
viewed at Gatagara, Ruhengeri, explained that they
fled their homes in March, which was immediately
after harvesting, but they were unable to take much
of the harvested sorghum with them. As they fled,
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scores of refugees descended upon the area, looting
whatever sorghum had been stored in people's
homes. Again, though, it is important to stress that
the situation varied from commune to commune.
In Macaca, unlike Gatagara, not much sorghum was
looted and enough sorghum seed preserved despite
the poor yield that resulted from the inability to
weed.
As a general rule, the sorghum crop in northern
Rwanda (harvested, looted) had suffered more than
the crop in the eastern part of the country (not
havested until much later; hardly looted).
Livelihoods and internal seasonal
labour migrations
Farmers stressed that the restoration of opportu-
nities for seasonal wage work - which includes
the restoration of internal migrant flows - is
essential to the rehabilitation of the agricultural
sector. Taking up wage labour opportunities
involves inter-zonal migration, especially by men,
but this remained impossible as the end of the war
had not ended the insecurity inside Rwanda. Along
with the problem of lawfully sorting out access to
'vacant' farms, the restoration of opportunities for
seasonal wage work was one of the more formida-
ble challenges the government faced in the context
of agricultural rehabilitation. To give an example
from Gikongoro, farmers who were host to refugees
in Musebeya commune explained they were help-
ing relatives and friends from areas such as
Bugesera and Butare, i.e. areas towards which the
male hosts normally departed in September-
October to take up agricultural work. In normal
times, Musebeya's migrant men bring home not
only wages but also food (sorghum) and seed
(beans, sorghum, maize). A similar flow of labour
takes place when Bugesera's coffee crops are ready
to be picked.
Seasonal opportunities in agriculture had been
disrupted in two major ways. First, the war and
lingering insecurity had halted inter-prefectural
migrations by men towards productive areas. As
September-October is an ideal time for taking up
* 'Seeds of Hope' has also been criticised by the Rwanda capacity building (Joint Evaluation of Emergency
Government, FAO, and several NGOs for its failure to Assistance to Rwanda, 1996: 44-45).
concentrate on in-country research, multiplication and
agricultural wage work, a vast number of men and
their households were cut off from primary sources
of income, even from sources of seed. Second, the
absence of large(r) landowners throughout the
country many of whom had fled or been killed,
had led to a dramatic reduction in local wage
labour opportunities, especially for women.
This means that both women and men had lost
major sources of income.
Households reliant on seasonal agricultural wage
work - and they are numerous - had suffered severe
financial losses over at least one full year. In
September 1994, this constraint was of the same
magnitude as the unavailability of seeds and tools.
Vulnerable people
At the end of the SCF study, it was obvious that the
category of vulnerable people, as outlined in the
FAO/WFP report, needed to be expanded. To the
sub-categories identified by FAO/WFP it was neces-
sary to add: communities not reached by the aid
organizations (e.g. in certain eastern parts of
Byumba); communes affected by prolonged mili-
tary insecurity (e.g. in Bugesera and south Butare);
and widows who had lost husbands, property and
their entitlement to access land.5
In mid-September 1994, the RPF administration in
Butare prefecture compiled figures on widows,
orphans and unaccompanied children. These fig-
ures were expected to run into several tens of thou-
sands. Within the group of affected farmers,
described by FAO/WFP as having suffered harvest
losses and being denied adequate access to food
and seeds, special attention should go to those
farmers who had been host to internally displaced
people. (The RPF-led administration is unlikely to
do this as it argues that the population of the south-
west helped to protect the perpetrators of geno-
cide.) Another vulnerable group to be included are
the non-pastoralist returnees who settled in
Byumba. Being very resource poor and having to
adapt to a more settled way of life, such returnees
must be prioritized for assistance.
For an excellent discussion of social vulnerability and
land access in Rwanda in the late 1980s, see André
(1995).
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3 Season I 995A and its Effects on
'Seeds of Hope'
On 18 October 1994, FAO announced that the
international 'Seeds and Tools' relief effort had
succeeded. The communique said:
FAO estimates that by the end of October, 2
million persons in Rwanda will have been pro-
vided with seeds. FAO reported that the co-
ordination of seed and tool distribution among
NGOs has been good; however, transport of
these items remains a serious problem.
(InterPress Service, 18/10/94)
The figure of two million persons reached had to be
put into perspective, however, because the claimed
success contrasted with the failure to persuade
refugees and IDPs to return home. The figure of 2
million may well have included all those in need
who lived at home inside Rwanda, which makes
the achievement impressive, but not reached were
the close to two million IDPs.6 In sum, the danger
of another lost planting season was averted, but
concerns remained. Above all, what had not been
averted was the danger of hunger and famine for
the country as a whole. Up to two million people
inside Rwanda, living mostly in IDP camps, would
not harvest in January 1995.
At the end of the 1995A season, before 'Seeds of
Hope' would come into effect, the Minister of
Agriculture reflected on the first post-war harvest.
The picture, still somewhat bleak, nonetheless
confirmed that the narrative/prediction of a total
ecological disaster had been exaggerated and that
a major food crisis had been averted.
Since April 1994 three out of every four
farmers have been displaced. The harvests last
August-September have been largely insuffi-
cient. The December-January harvests have
yielded between 47 and 55 per cent of a normal
year.
According to the Ministry, cereal production is
down by 64 per cent, legumes (then the only
6 UNAMIRs estimate in mid-September was 1,967,960.
source of protein) by 70 per cent, bananas by
38 per cent, and tubers by 57 per cent.
"Losses vary according to prefecture," Mr
lyamuremye explains. In South Kigali,
Bugesera and South Butare, the damage is
enormous: there is hardly anyone there, and
so there is hardly any seed. In North Kigali,
the situation is satisfactory
In the North, in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, "the
situation is normal. The population is present
and cultivates. We are hoping for good har-
vests." Right now, Ruhengeri provides Kigali
with Irish potatoes. Byumba, where most of
the fighting between the warring armies took
place and where the population fled, has
become repopulated .. "The people are back
and enjoy excellent yields following the four
year fallow that was forced upon them," the
Minister continues. Finally, although the popu-
lation of Kibungo has fled to Tanzania, the
banana groves still provide us with ample fruits.
Regarding the July [1995) harvests, Rwandan
authorities are predicting yields between 60 and
70 per cent of what is normally harvested
(La Libre Belgique 15/3/95)
FAO/WFP (1995) confirmed the broader picture
Iyamuremye sketched, but raised the agricultural
performance to closer the 60 per cent mark. Times
were hard, but with 2 million people still abroad,
the achievement was not a disaster. The good har-
vest in North Rwanda, the second consecutive good
harvest in fact, was most encouraging. The FAO
verdict: 'Total 1995 season A food crop production
(excluding oilseeds, fruits and vegetables) is esti-
mated at 1.4 million tons, which, in cereal equiva-
lent terms is only 58 per cent of the pre-civil strife
average' (FAO/WFP 1995).
Although FAO/WFP recommended 'protracted
donor support ... in order to restore staple food pro-
duction to pre-civil strife level' (FAO/WFP 1995), it
also emerged from assessments by NGOs, notably
CARE International, that the availability of certain
Consumption rates were estimated at: Byumba (57
per cent), Gikongoro (84 per cent), Gitarama (79 per
cent), Kibungo (63 per cent) and Kigali (58 per cent).
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crops in certain regions had been higher than
expected. Assessing Season A harvests and its own
role in ensuring their success, CARE (1995) ques-
tioned, for example, 'the appropriateness of
sorghum for future distribution ... in Rwanda...' As
part of its programme for emergency relief and
recovery assistance, CARE had purchased sorghum
for distribution in five prefectures. Subsequently,
CARE estimated that most of the distributed seed
had been consumed rather than plantedl7 The high
consumption rates (for which a number of reasons
could be listed) indicated that farmers had their
own ways of procuring suitable seed (CARE 1995:
6). Given the very low price of sorghum in Eastern
Rwanda so soon after the war ended (see
Kabukuba, above), the CARE finding is hardly sur-
prising.
Equally revealing in terms of Rwanda's capacity to
procure its own seed, a needs assessment by MINA-
GRIIFAO in late 1994 concluded for cassava and
sweet potatoes that a disaster scenario did not
apply. MINAGRI/FAO then recommended that
'Seeds of Hope' drop these crops from its interven-
tion programme (D. Donati: pers. comm.).
So what happened to 'Seeds of
Hope'?
Given that by December 1994 it was known that
sorghum, cassava and sweet potatoes had survived
as planting material, it is something of a surprise
that CGIAR continued with its original disaster nar-
rative: simple diagnosis, perfect solution. Equally
puzzling is that CGIAR never carried out its own
assessment, despite an initial promise that the pro-
gramme would 'assess diversity in Rwanda immedi-
ately after the civil war' (Scowcroft, 'Seeds of Hope'
Circular, 8/7/94) As it turned out, no such assess-
ment was undertaken.
Two questions now come to mind: Why did CGIAR
persist with the narrative? And what happened to
the programme? I shall deal with the second
question first, reserving the other one for the
conclusions.
The story that needs to be told now is that 'Seeds
and Tools' (Phase 1) was a successful operation
which made the mega 'Seeds of Hope' programme
virtually redundant. In addition, farmer resource-
fulness had been underestimated, while 'Seeds of
Hope' had exaggerated in its prediction of vast
genetic erosion resulting from a short war.
The crux of the matter is that 'Seeds of Hope' had
been conceived on two flawed assumptions.8 First,
the claim in July 1994 that germplasm would be
lost on a significant scale was exaggerated.
Germplasm does not disappear just like that; the
timeframe of the Rwanda disaster had been too
short for loss of gerrnplasm to occur. Especially in
the case of beans and sweet potatoes, farmers
turned out to be more resourceful than had been
anticipated. Food aid and 'Seeds and Tools' distrib-
utions in August-September 1994 had also helped
farmers to conserve seeds. Second, the germplasm
collections preserved in laboratories outside
Rwanda (in some cases over a thousand kilometres
away from the areas of origin) turned out to be
not-quite-like the germplasm found in situ. Because
of the lack of interaction with soil, laboratory
preserved germplasm was no longer loo percent
identical to the (evolved) on-farm samples found
in Rwanda today
The collections returned to Rwanda were also,
allegedly, too small to be useful for seed multiplica-
tion. Some 100 bean varieties, for example, were
handed over to the Service de Semences
Sélectionnées (SSS), but only four major types
came in quantities large enough to be useful for
multiplication. Of these four varieties, three (K20,
A221 and H75) were thought not to be very well
adapted to conditions in Rwanda (D. Donati: pers.
comm.). Donati singled out K20 as a bean which,
even if productive, was insufficiently resistant to
viruses. His main point, which conforms with
views in the Ministry of Rehabilitation
(MINIREISO), was that the benefits of 'Seeds of
Hope' would have gone principally to commercial
interests outside Rwanda. 'Seeds of Hope' had been
a case of 'the cat chasing its tail'.
This information is based on interviews with Francesco
del Re (WFP) and Daniel Donati (FAO) in Kigali, in
August 1995.
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Conclusions
When Prime Minister Twagiramungu stepped down
in late August 1995, he revealed how the RPF
expertly exploits the guilt with which the interna-
tional community is burdened.
'That the international community did not pre-
vent the genocide has hither deep in the stom-
ach,' analyses Twagiramungu. 'She feels guilty
and in debt to the RPF -which did end the
genocide - and eases her conscience with a vari-
ety of aid programmes.'
(De Standaard 14/9/95)
Although 'Seeds of Hope' was an example of the
kind of aid Twagiramungu referred to, it is doubtful
that it would have been based on guilt. Rather,
CGIAR regarded the Rwanda crisis as a perfect
opportunity to justify 25 years of germplasm col-
lecting around the world. Importantly, this oppor-
tunity came at a time when international genebanks
were under attack.
For CGIAR, 1994 was a crossroads year. As an ODI
briefing paper reveals, by 1994 IARCs had slipped
from the top of most donors' agendas. For a variety
of reasons - e.g. agricultural expansion being
blamed for deforestations worldwide, fears that
private capital would gain control of much of the
world's germplasm, and others - CGIAR had seen
its core funding fall by more than 20 per cent in
five years. When the Rwanda human disaster
became evident, CGIAR was facing a 'crisis of
direction and support' (ODI, September 1994).
CGTAR's decision to go ahead with a mega seed
replacement programme for Rwanda preceded the
FAO/WFP (1994) assessment and was made on the
assumption - never investigated! - that the loss of
genetic material was vast. That the programme
might not be responding to real need was of no con-
cern to the programme's architects. They had the
means to intervene, so they would go in and do the
job. A proper needs assessment would have
required quite a modification to 'Seeds of Hope' as
conceptualised by CGIAR9 - so it was better to
remain ignorant.
This reminds of famine situations and the particu-
lar logic that when agencies (with media help) por-
tray the people affected as helpless, they can then
justify their intervention and reproduce themselves
through it. There is then no need to wait, no need
to ask questions about how the affected population
might cope in the absence of outside intervention.
In the face of famine, the international community
cand media) pay scant attention to local coping
strategies. Instead, they focus on helplessness -
helpless victims whose survival can only be secured
(the logic continues) through international relief
(D'Souza 1988). Whilst such victims exist, there
are also others who attempt to survive through their
own efforts. More to the point even, coping strate-
gies, as De Waal (1989) has shown for Darfur, may
be misread by observers. In short, outsiders who
come to the rescue have a poorly developed capac-
ity (read: inclination) for understanding how
affected populations are themselves trying to cope.
By ignoring local attempts to cope, outside agencies
can formulate their own (standardized) version of
events and offer their own standardized rescue
package.
The same mechanism - misread, standardize the
diagnosis, standardize the response - is at work in
the context of ecology and forestry in Africa, where
it is now understood that dramatic landscape
changes easily result in diagnoses and prescriptions
that do not correspond to the realities and percep-
tions of those affected. The professional failure to
investigate local meanings of landscape change
results in a standardized 'packaging' of environ-
mental problems and a universal, equally standard-
ized approach to solutions (Leach and Mearns
1996: 19 - 20; Ferguson 1994). The practice incul-
cates the view that stewardship over natural
resources is a state responsibility which can be del-
egated to expert elites, national and international
(Roe 1995: 1066).
It was the same in Rwanda. The way the Rwanda
agricultural crisis has been portrayed and sustained
via the media has made the people of Rwanda seem
totally helpless and dependent on external aid.
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Whilst this characterization may have helped to
unlock international funds at a time when the new
government was desperate for such funds, the res-
cue package for agriculture (and the media mes-
sages in support) unmistakably perpetuated the
image of Rwanda as a helpless country
That famine was averted in the aftermath of the war
and genocide had much to do with the interna-
tional 'Seeds and Tools' effort, I do not deny this.
But famine was also averted through the efforts of
the people of Rwanda themselves and through
efforts by the RPF who, aided by UNICEF and the
Catholic Relief Service (CRS), mobilized the popu-
lation for the purpose of harvesting and planting.
Farmers' invididual efforts to procure the right seed
for their farms went unrecorded, yet contributed in
no small way to the aversion of famine conditions.
Farmers had been resilient and resourceful, know-
ing full well how to get by under difficult circum-
stances.
Immediately following the war, the international
community failed to appreciate the diversity of con-
ditions inside Rwanda's food production sector.
Available seed supplies were never investigated, nor
was any attention paid to the differential impact
the war had had on and within Rwanda's prefec-
tures. This underreporting enabled the interna-
tional aid world to 'package' Rwanda as a country
whose devastated agriculture could not recover
without the kind of technical, apolitical interven-
tion the West (read: CGIAR) had in mind. It could
therefore be argued that 'Helpless Rwanda' was cre-
ated to help legitimate the very existence of a super
power which sought recognition for its services.
See following page for a postscript to this
article and references.
Initially a budget of US$ 1,800,000 was made available the aid organization World Vision (New Scientist
for the programme, about half of which came from 27/8/94). At a later stage, the World Bank stepped in
USAID. Further funding was secured from the with additional funds.
governments of Australia, Britain and Switzerland and
Postscript
The purpose of this article was to reflect on
Rwanda's agricultural needs and their assessment
in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 war. It is
not therefore an evaluation of the entire 'Seeds of
Hope' programme, which began in early 1995.
Despite its critical edge, the article must not be
read as involving criticism of the 'Seeds of Hope'
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